The Origins of English Aging Policy: A Re-Examination of the Cyclical Theory of Social Relief by Williamson, John B. & Branco, Kenneth J.
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 12
Issue 1 March Article 2
March 1985
The Origins of English Aging Policy: A Re-
Examination of the Cyclical Theory of Social Relief
John B. Williamson
Boston College
Kenneth J. Branco
Boston College
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Social Welfare Commons, and the Social Work Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Work at
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact
maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Williamson, John B. and Branco, Kenneth J. (1985) "The Origins of English Aging Policy: A Re-Examination of the Cyclical Theory of
Social Relief," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 12 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol12/iss1/2
THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH AGING POLICY:
A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE CYCLICAL THEORY
OF SOCIAL RELIEF
JOHN B. WILLIAMSON, Ph.D.
KENNETH J. BRANCO, MSW
Department of Sociology
Boston College
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the explanatory power
of Piven and Cloward's cyclical theory of
social relief through an exploration of
policies in England from the twelfth through
the nineteenth century. While there is
evidence of a cyclical trend between restric-
tive and liberal policies in this period, we
find that those shifts cannot consistently be
explained by social turmoil. There is also
evidence of a long-term trend toward a more
restrictive aging policy which is unaccounted
for by cyclical theory. This trend can be
better explained by a more basic set of ideas
uncerlying cyclical theory, i.e., the needs of
a capitalist economic system.
INTRODUCTION
In their classic work, Regulating the
PoQr , Piven and Cloward (1971) argued that
there was a cyclical relationship between
government relief policies and social protest.
The central theme of the cyclical theory is
that when mass unemployment led to civil
disorder, governments were compelled to calm
the masses through the provision of relief.
Conversely, when rioting, looting and other
forms of expressing collective distress
subsided, governments cut back on their
efforts to relieve poverty. During the latter
periods, a shell of the relief system was left
for the aged and other "impotents".
Piven and Cloward contend that the
degrading manner in which these "impotents"
were treated is evidence that the primary
function of public welfare in periods of
social stability is to encourage those capable
of work to shun relief and "... to offer
themselves to any employer on any terms"
(1971:34). The aged are thus viewed as
residual persons in the formulation of relief
policy.
The cyclical theory was and is useful in
debunking the myth that social welfare efforts
are undertaken with solely humanitarian and
altruistic intent. Rather, relief efforts are
seen as tools of social control. Relief is
utilized by elites, as the book title
suggests, to regulate the poor in and out of
the labor market at wages favorable to owners,
while maintaining the public order necessary
for the conduct of profitable commerce.
We find the Piven and Cloward thesis
compelling. If we look at the trajectory of
relief policy in England from the twelfth
through the nineteenth century, we see a
cyclical pattern. There is clearly movement
between more and less restrictive relief
policies. However, this model leaves some
important evidence unexplained. For example,
there was a great deal of civil disorder that
directly preceded the Reform of 1834 (de
Schweinitz, 1943). However, instead of liber-
alization, the response was a more restrictive
relief policy. It would seem that for the
English case, a policy of repression was
preferred to a policy of liberalization.
There is also evidence of a long-term
trend from a less restrictive old age relief
policy to a more restrictive policy. How do
we account for what appears to be an
increasingly restrictive and harsh approach to
old age relief between the twelfth and the
nineteenth century? The trend cannot be
explained by a steady decline in social
disorder, for disorder rose and fell between
the twelfth and nineteenth century. In fact,
even if there had been a steady decline in
disorder, the Piven and Cloward thesis would
not adequately explain a harsher treatment of
the aged.
Policy toward the aged is correctly
treated as a residual phenomenon by Piven and
Cloward. However, their theory cannot ade-
quately predict if a rise in social disorder
which leads to liberalization of relief policy
toward riotous laborers will include
liberalization toward the aged, or to
restrictions on the aged in order that more
resources be diverted to the troublesome
portions of the population. While a strong
case can be made for seeing policy toward the
aged as a residual phenomenon, cyclical theory
needs application and supplementation in order
to account for the treatment of the aged.
We believe that a more basic set of ideas
underlying the Piven and Cloward thesis can
better explain the increasingly restrictive
policies toward the aged, i.e., the transition
from a feudal to a market economy and the
needs of a capitalist economy. In this paper,
we shall view the effects of the transition on
policy toward the aged by examining five
policy periods in English history. They are:
1. Medieval Relief Policy prior to the
14th Century.
2. The 14th century Statutes of
Laborers.
3. 16th and 17th century Relief Policy.
4. 18th century Relief Policy.
5. Poor Law Reform in the 19th century.
Through this approach, we shall seek an
explanation of both the residual effects on
the aged of policies directed primarily at
other groups as well as an explanation of
restrictive policies toward the aged.
MEDIEVAL RELIEF POLICY PRIOR TO THE 14TH
CENTURY
As early as the 6th century, the
Christian church was actively involved in poor
relief through its system of largely rural
monasteries (Webb and Webb, 1972). But it is
not until 1140 with the codification of Church
law in the DECRETUM that we have a thorough
statement of medieval church law concerning
poor relief (Tierney, 1959). Relief policy
did vary from one feudal estate to another,
but it was relatively stable from the twelfth
through the middle of the fourteenth century.
Church policy toward the poor was
virtually the only public policy for this
period of more than two hundred years
(Cipolla, 1976). Everyone was a member of the
Church and potentially eligible for relief.
The Crown and feudal lords viewed relief as a
Church function. The Church had its own
ecclesiastical tax, the tithe, to finance its
relief efforts. Based on the DECRETUM medieval
canonists argued that the poor had a right to
relief and those who were better off had the
obligation to provide it (Coll, 1969).
The Church's position was that some were
born rich and some were born poor. Poverty
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was seen as part of God's design, not as a
reflection of personal failure or moral
turpitude. The existence of poverty provided
an opportunity for the well-off to demonstrate
Christian charity.
This morality was not separate from the
economic institutions of Medieval Europe.
Because medieval serfs were tied to the land,
they were economic assets to the feudal lord.
He had a clear economic interest in keeping
his serfs in good health so that they would be
able to work the land. Thus, he could be
expected to participate in relief efforts in
times of need, often by providing food or
money to the parish church for distribution
(de Schweinitz, 1943).
Medieval relief policy toward the aged
poor was not sharply differentiated from
policy toward other dependent categories such
as the blind or disabled. Under ordinary
circumstances not much was made of the
distinction between the infirm elderly poor
and the able-bodied poor. In the extended
family system of the time such distinctions
were impractical under normal circumstances,
and further, there was very little involuntary
un-employment in the modern sense of the term.
However, in the DECRETUM distinctions were
made that were to be used when resources for
relief were limited. In such situations the
"impotent" (infirm) elderly were to be given a
higher priority than the able-bodied (Tierney,
1959; Coll, 1969). In the medieval period
then, there is evidence that policy toward the
aged was less restrictive. This is not to say
that being an impoverished aged peasant is a
social status that one would aspire to. It
does however suggest that those in control of
the feudal economy had both a moral and an
economic stake in a benevolent stance toward
the aged poor.
THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY STATUTES OF LABORERS
During the late Middle Ages, the feudal
social order began to disintegrate. By 1350
only fifty percent of the English population
were serfs (Coulton, 1925). The rise of towns
and the development of an international market
for English woolen cloth contributed to the
change. So did the shift from sharecropping
and feudal services to a system of cash
payments (Bennett, 1937). This emergence of a
money economy provided a means for serfs to
buy their freedom and created job pportunities
for those able to escape bondage. In England
the breakdown of the feudal order was well on
its way by the mid-fourteenth century
(Coulton, 1925; Tierney, 1959).
In 1348 the bubonic plague reached
England causing a sharp reduction in pop-
ulation which turned out to have some positive
consequences for the peasants who survived (de
Schweinitz, 1943). The shortage of labor
dramatically drove up wages which in turn
accelerated the long-term social changes
associated with the decline of feudalism that
were already in process. It became increas-
ingly easy and attractive to escape bondage
for work as an artisan in town or as a free
laborer on another estate (Coulton, 1925).
Strong economic incentives encouraged laborers
to move from one region to another in search
of higher paying jobs. Between jobs, many
turned to begging. Some joined vagrant bands
which led to an increase in thievery and
banditry (Coll, 1969).
The response was a major shift in public
relief policy coming with the enactment of a
series of laws referred to as The Statutes of
Laborers between 1349 and 1388 (Nicholls,
1898; Leonard, 1900). These laws were prim-
arily designed to deal with the social
disorder caused by a sharp increase in the
movement of labor and marauding bands of
beggars. The 1388 statute prohibited begging
by the able-bodied. Begging by the infirm
elderly, the blind, or disabled was permitted,
but only if it were done at their place of
current residence.
The Statutes of Laborers were basically
repressive measures designed to control the
geographic mobility, wage demands, vagrancy,
and begging of the peasants. The motive for
this first instance of state regulation of
begging was in no sense a humanitarian concern
for the plight of destitute beggars. The
legislation would not have been enacted if
most beggars had been disabled, blind, or
elderly. The goal was to force the able-
bodied to work at "reasonable" wages.
These statutes were not successful in
eliminating begging by the able-bodied, but
they did help elderly beggars by reducing the
competition. The statutes had another seren-
dipitous consequence: children were discour-
aged from leaving the local area and as a
result were more likely to be available to
provide help to elderly parents.
The fourteenth century s important in our
analysis since it marks the first occasion of
state intrusion into relief policy. It is
also important in the context of cyclical
theory. Here we have an instance of social
disorder which is met with repression rather
than liberalization of relief policy. How do
we reconcile that fact with cyclical theory:
which suggests that liberalization follows
disorder? If we keep in mind the more basic
theme of a transition to a market economy and
wage labor, then repression is a logical
solution in this instance. The plague created
a shortage of laborers. Liberalization would
only be useful policy to elites if there were
many more laborers than the economy could
absorb at low wages.
Just as in earlier periods in English
history, the aged escaped the stigmatization
of having to beg illegally. There were too
few of them to pose any serious threat to the
emerging market economy. There was still no
need for specific mechanisms of social control
of the aged. Simply left to beg on the
streets, they served adequate examples of the
virtues of toil.
16TH AND 17TH CENTURY POOR LAW
During the fifteenth century, economic
conditions were generally favorable for
peasants throughout Europe (Coulton, 1925;
Braudel, 1967).
The sixteenth century, in contrast,
brought a marked deterioration in economic
conditions for the laboring class (Oxley,
1974). A number of factors contributed to
this change, but of particular importance was
increased dependence on a market economy due
to the growth of the international market for
English woolen cloth and the related trend
toward the enclosure of land for sheep herding
(Webb and Webb, 1927). The evolving market
economy was making the nation increasingly
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of inter-
national markets and the cyclical trends of
capitalist economies. This lead to a sharp
increase in the number of vagrants and beggars
which contributed to an upswing in social
disorder, crime, and food riots (Webb and
Webb, 1927; Hampson, 1934).
Something had to be done to maintain
social order. Cyclical theory would predict a
liberalization of relief, but this did not
occur. The first attempts were similar to the
fourteenth century Statutes of Laborers.
Their emphasis was on the suppression of
begging, particularly by the able bodied
(Ashley, 1883). The first statute passed, the
Poor Law of 1531, called for public whipping
of all able-bodied beggars. The "impotent",
including the elderly, could apply for
permission to beg. The Poor Law of 1536
entirely prohibited begging, even by the
infirm elderly. Penalties for begging began
with whipping and branding and if deemed
necessary included execution (de Schweinitz,
1943).
The Poor Law statutes enacted between
1531 and 1576 were synthesized in the com-
prehensive statute of 1597. With minor
changes this became the Elizabethan Poor Law
of 1601, the foundation for English relief
policy during the next two hundred years
(Leonard, 1900). The Poor Law of 1601 called
for a poor tax to generate the revenues needed
to provide relief. The poor were divided into
three categories: (1) children, (2) the able-
bodied, and (3) the impotent. Different
policies were suggested for each. The able-
bodied were not denied relief so long as they
were willing to accept work provided by poor
relief officials.
The legislation was enacted in response
to continuing food riots, looting and other
crimes against property. Begging was
prohibited, and able-bodied beggars who
refused to work were sent to jail. Relief
policy continued to be closely linked to
concerns about social control of workers but
there was nothing simple and direct about the
relationship between riot and relief.
Had all of the poor been infirm, elderly,
blind, or disabled, it is likely that their
destitution would have gone all but unnoticed.
This legislation was designed primarily as a
way to control the able-bodied. They were the
ones most likely and most able to turn to the
violence and destruction that threatened the
interests of property owners. The elderly
were included in this legislation, bu they
were not the focus. Children were required to
provide for their elderly parents (Webb and
Webb, 1927), and those aged without children
were provided for at home or in the alms house
(Leonard, 1900). This more liberal legis-
lation was aimed at the creation of the more
docile class of laborers required by the
developing market economy.
At other times repression served that
goal best, as with the Law of Settlement and
Removal enacted in 1662 (Henric ues, 1979). It
was a response to labor mobility and the
desire of taxpayers in one area to avoid
paying relief for recent migrants from other
areas (Webb and Webb, 1927). Public officials
were given the right to make recent migrants
leave the parish if it seemed likely that they
would become public dependents. Such persons
were required to return to their parish of
legal settlement (de Schweinitz, 1943).
The Law of Settlement and Removal had
particularly adverse consequences for older
laborers. The older, less productive workers
had to search longer and further for employers
when the market was tight. They were also
viewed as potential dependents and thus were
more vulnerable than were younger workers to
the provisions of the statute. The most
important aspect of this act is that it
signals a shift toward a more restrictive
policy toward the poor. It is indicative of a
generally more punitive policy that char-
acterized the period from the mid-seventeenth
century to the late eighteenth century.
One factor contributing to this shift in
attitude and policy was the Protestant
Reformation. The Puritans and other sects
inspired by Calvinistic ideology were becoming
popular particularly among merchants, crafts-
men, and small land holders (de Beauvoir,
1972). The Calvinist stress on thrift,
industry, and sobriety fit well with the
entrepreneurial orientation of the growing and
increasingly influential middle class (Coll,
1969). The Calvinist conception of pre-
destination was also important as it lead to
the search for signs that one had been
selected for salvation; economic success was
taken as one such sign (Weber, 1958). These
values led to the practice of blaming the poor
for their poverty and blaming the elderly for
their improvidence in not having made an
effort to accumulate assets to live on during
the later years.
18TH CENTURY RELIEF POLICY
In 1722 a statute was passed which
required that all recipients move into the
workhouse as precondition for relief. Thus
all who sought relief, the elderly as well as
the able-bodied, were to be subjected to the
indignity, stigma, loss of autonomy,
regimentation, and social control associated
with such institutions. One goal was to make
relief so unattractive that only those who
were truly needy would apply; another was to
provide that relief which was necessary at the
minimum possible expense (de Schweinitz,
1943).
These repressive measures would not
persist however. The late eighteenth century
was a period of mass unemployment, outbreaks
of violence, and social disorder. In keeping
with cyclical theory, this disruption was
followed by liberalization.
In 1782 with the enactment of the Gilbert
Act, the Statute of 1722 was neutralized
(Rose, 1971). On the surface it appears that
social reformers were successful in their
efforts to discredit the workhouses. It was
the very high infant mortality rates rather
than the often squalid conditions which many
of the elderly were subjected to that proved
most persuasive to members of Parliament (de
Schweinitz, 1943). The poor would no longer
be required to enter the workhouse as a
precondition for relief. That these reforms
were more in the keeping with a goal of
quieting the violent masses rather than
improving the care of the impotent is
evidenced by the fact that the workhouses were
not closed. They continued to operate "on
behalf" of the aged, sick, infirm, orphan
children, or children with their mothers.
They were simply off-limits to the able-
bodied, who were to be more carefully treated
(Webb and Webb, 1927).
Liberalization toward the able-bodied con-
tinued when in 1795 Parliament approved a
system of wage supplements referred to as the
Speenhamland system. The most radical aspect
of this new policy is that it did not
discourage the able-bodied from seeking
relief; to the contrary, it made relief more
or less automatic with none of the stigma of
the workhouse (Polanyi, 1944).
At first the impact of the Speenhamland
system on the elderly poor was positive. It
made up the difference between what the worker
was able to earn and what was needed for
subsistence. Thus older, less productive
workers could remain in the labor force
longer. But eventually the system severely
depressed wages and ceased to adequately make
up the difference between wages paid and
subsistence (Polanyi, 1944). Older workers
were becoming a part of the economic
underclass required by the further developed
market economy.
POOR LAW REFORM IN THE 19TH CENTURY
The liberalization of relief policy
during the late eighteenth century was
reversed with the enactment of the Poor Law
Reform of 1834 (Rose, 1971). The most
important policy change was that able-bodied
applicants were once again required to enter
the workhouse as a condition for the receipt
of relief. The condition of those on relief
was no less desirable ("less eligible") than
that of the lowest paid laborers not on relief
(Webb and Webb, 1910). The goal was to avoid
making the workhouse an attractive option for
able-bodied laborers working at low wages.
This restrictive shift affected agri-
cultural workers who were often discriminated
against. Long before a worker was in any
obvious way disabled by the infirmities of old
age, he became less productive and thus less
attractive to employers than younger workers.
These landless older agricultural workers were
often forced into beggary of the workhouse.
As they were not suffering from the infirm-
ities of extreme old age, for purposes of
relief they were classified as able-bodied.
Not only these workers, but also their
dependents were forced to make a choice
between the workhouse and starvation.
This new legislation did not call for any
change in Poor Law provisions dealing with the
infirm elderly (Webb and Webb, 1910). But it
did have the effect of increasing the pro-
portion of the elderly who ended up in the
workhouse. One reason was that the legis-
lation was part of a more general shift in the
direction of harsher attitudes and policies
toward the poor (de Schweinitz, 1943; Polanyi,
1944; Coll, 1969). All categories of the poor
including the infirm elderly were more likely
to be blamed and held in contempt for being
paupers. Local poor relief authorities had a
great deal of discretion in the implementation
of poor relief policy. This shift in attitude
toward the poor made even the elderly poor
vulnerable to these more restrictive policies.
In many areas the workhouse became the choice
of first rather than last resort not only for
the able-bodied, but also for the elderly and
other impotent categories (Webb and Webb,
1929).
A major stimulus to the enactment of the
1834 Reform was the rapid increase in poor
taxes since the turn of the century (Webb and
Webb, 1927; de Schweinitz, 1943). During this
same period there was a marked increase in the
number of persons on relief, particularly in
areas which had implemented the Speenhamland
system (Hammond and Hammond, 1910). The
conclusion reached by many policy makers (and
taxpayers) was that the liberal Speenhamland
system was causing pauperization (Coll, 1969).
Tax monies could be saved and the able-bodied
could be saved from a life of dependency, if
only a more restrictive relief policy were
implemented. There was considerable social
disorder in this period, and this restrictive
shift is clearly not accounted for by cyclical
theory.
If the elderly were required to move into
the workhouse, this would provide a strong
incentive to find some alternative means of
subsistence. Some would do without, some
would turn to their children, and some would
find yet other ways to avoid institu-
tionalization. It would also provide an
incentive to children both to support their
elderly parents and to set aside funds for
their own old age (Webb and Webb, 1929).
Under these conditions people will work longer
hours for less compensation. That is
precisely what was required by the owners of
the Industrial Revolution.
CONCLUSIONS
Looking at the long-term trend in poor
relief policy for England from the twelfth
through the nineteenth century, the pattern is
clearly cyclical. The most useful theoretical
account of this pattern is that proposed by
Piven and Cloward (1971). According to their
account when mass unemployment leads to
outbreaks of civil disorder, ruling elites
expand relief programs as a mechanism of
social control designed to restore political
stability. In the English case there is much
evidence to support this interpretation of
poor relief efforts. It fits well with the
liberalization of relief policies during the
early seventeenth century (the Elizabethan
Poor Law) and the late eighteenth century (the
Speenhamland System).
But there are also a number of major
policy shifts that are not explained by their
model. As we have seen, the theory needs
amplification in order to explain the punitive
response to civil disorder during the four-
teenth century (the Statutes of Laborers) and
the early sixteenth century (the early Poor
Law statutes). It also does not adequately
deal with the Poor law Reform of 1834 which
was a distinctively restrictive response to
the civil disorder and turmoil of the era.
It would seem that for the English case a
policy of repression was generally preferred
to a policy of liberalization. A policy of
liberalization was an alternative resorted to
when repression alone would not restore social
order. In addition to the cyclical trend
between more liberal and more restrictive
relief policies, there was also a long-term
trend from less restrictive old age relief
policies to more restrictive policies.
One possibility for more restrictive
policy would be a long-term trend toward a
larger elderly population. Were harsher
policies needed as the proportion who were old
increased? Age structure estimates for
England prior to 1841 are only available for
selected villages, but there is sufficient
evidence to conclude that there was little if
any increase in the proportion of elderly
between the sixteenth and middle of the
nineteenth century (Laslett, 1976). Simi-
larly, we have no reason to believe that there
was any increase in the proportion of elderly
from the twelfth through the sixteenth
century. It is unlikely that changed in age
structure are responsible for the long-term
trend toward harsher policies.
We have argued in this paper that the
restrictive trend can better be explained by
the development of a market economy. In the
Middle Ages the market economy was just
starting to emerge and it had not advanced to
the point at which it was having a significant
impact on relief policy. Much more influ-
ential was the ideology of the Church which
viewed poverty as part of God's design and as
an opportunity to demonstrate Christian
Charity (Marshall, 1926). It was not a sign
of personal failure, a crime, or a sign of
immorality. Begging and voluntary poverty had
distinguished Church heritage (de Schweinitz,
1943). The feudal manor was largely self-
sufficient; neither the serfs nor the lords
were attempting to respond to outside market
demands. The relationship between serf and
lord was based on an exchange, albeit one that
much favored the lord. Because serfs were
needed to work the land and often difficult to
replace, the lord had an economic interest in
the health and well-being of his serfs.
By the early seventeenth century the more
developed market economy was having a
significant effect on poor relief policy.
Dobb (1963) has argued that the late 16th and
early 17th century marks the opening phase of
capitalism in England. In this period, labor-
power has become a commodity like any other
article of exchange. That transformation is
crucial in understanding both the history of
capitalism and the history of relief. In the
Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, the able-bodied
were put in a distinct relief category. They
were not to be given relief unless they were
willing to work. The cycles of the market
economy were contributing to periodic problems
of large scale unemployment. As an increasing
proportion of the population were drawn into
the market economy, more people became
vulnerable to these cycles. The resulting
mass unemployment was more than Church relief
could handle (Leonard, 1900). A public relief
system based on a compulsory poor tax offered
an alternative approach more consistent with
the economic realities of the early seven-
teenth century. During this era of mercan-
tilism, markets became a concern of the
government but there was little awareness of
the influence that markets would soon exert
over all spheres of social life. The idea of
a self-regulating economy was not yet
affecting public policy (Polanyi, 1944), but
there had been a sharp increase in the portion
of production carried out by wage earners
hired by capitalists (Dobb, 1963).
The Poor Law Reform of 1834 was
formulated at a time when England had a fully
developed market economy. The Reform of 1834
and its policy consequences reflected the
priorities of the self-regulating economy.
While it did not call for a total end to
government involvement in poor relief as some
laissez-faire advocates were suggesting (de
Schweinitz, 1943), it did represent the
minimum public poor relief possible at the
time given the need to maintain social order.
Relief was now intentionally made stigma-
tizing and degrading so as to discourage all
but the "truly needy" from becoming paupers
(public dependents). Relief had come to be
viewed as at best a necessary evil that
represented an undesirable reduction in the
economic return due the industrious. Many of
the infirm elderly and many older workers had
no choice but to accept these indignities as
the price for a meager subsistence.
These nineteenth century changes in
relief policy reflected the imperatives of
fully developed competitive capitalism. The
industrial revolution and the emergence of the
factory system led to a situation in which the
capitalist mode of prod-uction moved from
being important to the productive process to a
position of total dominance. Virtually the
entire economy was now based on work relations
between capitalists and wage earners (Dobb,
1963). Large-scale factory production severed
what little remaining hold the laboring
producer had on the means of production. The
creation of a class wholly dependent on wage
labor was complete.
Efforts to minimize relief and minimizc
the consumption of unproductive groups such as
the elderly poor were entirely consistent with
an economy dominated by competitive capital-
ism. Social legislation was now clearly aimed
at supporting the social relations of
production in capitalism. The right of owners
to appropriate the products of laborers was
well established in law and custom. So too
was an ideology that asserted the moral
superiority of the wealthy. Whereas in
Medieval Europe Holiness was gained through
acts of charity, in 19th century England
accumulation was seen as a sign of salvation.
Those who were most successful in "taking"
became defined as the greatest "givers" in the
capitalist social order. Those who "gave" the
products of their labors and were therefore
unable to support themselves in old age or
periods of unemployment became defined as the
immoral "takers. No piece of social legis-
lation since that time has seriously
challenged that ideology or
relations that it supports.
the social
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